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ABSTRACT
The research presented here involves the testing 
of hypotheses that concern the effect of juvenile court 
structural and procedural characteristics (measured as 
"court type") on pre—adjudicatory detention decisions.
Case data collected in two courts representing the 
traditional and due process polar types are analyzed. The 
courts are drawn from an empirical typology of metropolitan 
juvenile courts, in which courts are located according to 
their characteristics on five structural and procedural 
dimensions. The case data involved information on approxi­
mately 250 cases handled in each of the two courts. The 
data reflect social attributes of the juveniles, legal 
features of their cases, case processing activities, and 
detention decision outcomes. It is~hypothesized that 
social variables are significant determinants of detention 
in the traditional court and that legal variables are 
significant determinants of detention in the due process 
court. The hypotheses are only partially supported by the 
findings. Alternative hypotheses are suggested, however, _ 
that are consistent with the original expectations 
regarding the nature and effect of court structure and 
procedure on detention decision making. The findings 
confirm that court structural and procedural characteristics,
i.e., court type, should be introduced and systematically 
controlled as an important explanatory variable in research 
dealing with the nature of decision making in juvenile 
courts.
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THE ROLE OF JUVENILE COURT STRUCTURE ON 
PRE-ADJUDICATORY DETENTION DECISIONS
CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
AND A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this study is to test empirically 
hypothesized relationships between the structure of 
juvenile courts and the pre-adjudicatory detention decision. 
Pre-adjudicatory detention may be defined as "the temporary 
care of children in physically restricted facilities, pend­
ing court disposition" (Sheridan, L966:126). This research 
is guided by the theoretical premise that the type of court, 
as measured by certain structural and procedural character­
istics, is causally related to the detention decision.
Previous research has failed to consider adequately the role 
of court structural and procedural characteristics in ex­
plaining the pre-adjudicatory detention process.
Court type has been defined and exemplified in an 
empirical typology of metropolitan juvenile courts (Stapleton, 
Aday, and Ito, American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming). 
Individual juvenile court systems are located in the 
typology according to five structural and procedural 
dimensions. In the present effort I hypothesis that social 
variables (variables that describe the social characteristics 
of the offender) will be significant determinants of detention
3decision outcomes in a sample of the "traditional" court 
type. I hypothesize that variables describing legal 
characteristics of juvenile cases will be significant 
determinants of detention decision outcomes in a juvenile 
justice system representing the "due process" court type.
To test the hypotheses, I will analyze outcome data 
collected on approximately 250 juvenile cases handled in 
each of two typologically different courts. The courts 
are different in structural and procedural characteristics 
and are drawn from different geographic regions (Southern 
and non-Southern). The outcome data include information 
on various social and legal characteristics of the juveniles 
and their offenses as these were processed in each court.
Pre-adjudicatory detention represents an important 
and controversial decision within the juvenile justice 
process. The detained youth may experience a number of 
potentially deleterious effects. It has been estimated 
that many of the over one-half million juveniles detained 
annually in the United States have not been charged with 
any crime (Sarri, 1974). The median age of these youths 
is fourteen, and the average length of stay in a detention 
facility is eleven days. Detention facilities often 
resemble jails. Many are located next door to a jail and 
the staff may be used interchangeably. About one-half of 
the facilities maintain no treatment staff and one-fourth 
have no school program (Sarri, 1974).
Results from several recent studies suggest that
pre-trial detention may adversely bias subsequent court 
decisions regarding the detained youth (for example, see 
Cohen, 1975; Koza and Doob, 1975; Goldkamp, 1976). Dis­
positions that include relatively harsh punishment or 
long-term institutionalization may result because a detained 
youth is denied access to an attorney or is otherwise pre­
vented from preparing an adequate defense. It also has 
been suggested that pre-adjudicatory detention creates an 
atmosphere in which a juvenile feels compelled to plead 
guilty and submit to sentencing. Despite these important 
potential consequences, social scientists have not fully 
explored nor explained the criteria used by court personnel 
to determine which children will be detained.
The complexity of this issue becomes apparent in 
reviewing the relevant literature on juvenile court 
decision making in general, and pre-adjudicatory detention 
in particular. Some research suggests that court personnel 
are influenced most by the defendant's social characteris­
tics, including age, sex, and race (for example, Martin, 
1970; Arnold, 1971, Thornberry, 1973). Decisions based 
on such characteristics may, of course, result in unfair, 
negative biases and judicially inappropriate decisions.
Other research suggests that legal variables, such as the 
nature of the alleged offense, or a youth's previous 
court contacts, serve as the major determinants of 
juvenile court decision making (for example, Terry, 1967a; 
Burk and Turk, 1975). This mode of decision making is
5consistent with criminal courts— that is, with an emphasis 
on the alleged offense rather than on social information 
describing the offender.
The 1967 Supreme Court decision In. re Gault led the 
way in specifying the constitutional requirement of due 
process rights for juveniles. However, as Cohen and Kleugal 
(1975: 147) note, "agents of the juvenile justice system 
are relatively free from legal constraints and Supreme Court 
mandates at this stage (pre-adjudicatory detention) of the 
system. Hence, compared to dispositional decisions, rules 
for detention decisions are more ambiguous, the decisions 
themselves more variable."
Most of the studies involving decision making in 
juvenile courts focus on dispositional outcomes as the 
dependent variable. The literature revealed only four 
studies that deal specifically with determinants of the 
detention decision in juvenile courts. A review of studies 
dealing with both types of decision making is relevant, 
however. Dispositional and detention decision outcomes may 
be related and may be influenced by the same criteria and 
variables.
As mentioned, the research dealing with juvenile 
court decision making reveals a great deal of inconsistency. 
Some social scientists, such as Martin (1970), have concluded 
that the social characteristics of the offender are the 
major determinants of judicial decisions. Martin sees a 
decided class disadvantage working against lower class
6children. He believes that due to the strong middle class 
values and attitudes of most court personnel, objectivity 
is virtually impossible in judicial decisions. Thomas 
and Cage (1977:257) summarize this lack of objectivity by 
noting that "Generally speaking, previous research suggests 
that case dispositions will reflect, the preferences of 
those in positions of power and that they will discriminate 
against those who, for legally irrelevant reasons, lack 
the requisite social, economic, and political power that 
might otherwise inhibit their harsh treatment." (See also 
Scheff, 1966; Chambliss, 1969; Platt, 1969; Turk, 1969; 
Sutherland and Cressey, 1970; Rushing, 1971, Schur, 1971; 
Chiricos et al., 1972; and Schwartz and Skolnick, 1972).
Some researchers have found that blacks receive 
harsher sentences than whites (Arnold, 1971; Thomas and 
Sieverdes, 1973; Thornberry, 1973). Others indicate that _ 
youths from broken homes receive harsher sanctions than 
those from non-broken homes (Chused, 1973; Sieverdes, 1973); 
and that, females receive less favorable dispositions than 
males (Terry, 1967a, 1967b; Chused, 1973; Pawlak, 1973).
On the other hand, other research downgrades the 
significance of such discretionary bias in judicial decision 
making (Terry, 1967a; Hirschi 1969; Hagen, 1973; Tittle, 
1973; Weiner and Willie, 1974; Burk and Turk, 1975; Cohen 
and Kleugal, 1975; Ford and Tuchterhand, 1975; Wellford, 
1975). Terry (1967a) finds that neither class nor racial 
variables have a noticeable effect on the severity of
7dispositions when statistical controls are introduced.
Burk and Turk (1975) Conclude that neither race, parental 
occupational status, nor sex have significant effects on 
disposition.
In response to the inconsistency and contradiction 
of past efforts, some researchers have attempted to refine 
the statement of the problem. This has been done in an 
effort to achieve more consistent, reliable, and valid 
findings. Some attempted to refine the problem by specify­
ing status offenses as a special offense classification 
(Thomas and Sieverdes, 1975; Dungworth, 1977; Carter, 1979).
Another effort in this general area was undertaken by
Horowitz and Wasserman (1980) who distinguish social, or 
extralegal, factors in terms of discriminatory and discre­
tionary variables. Discriminatory variables include factors 
such as age, race, and sex. These traditionally have been -
used by researchers to test assumptions of bias. Discret­
ionary variables, such as present activity or living 
situation, reflect the character and social situation of an 
offender.
Other studies have emerged that attempt to explain 
the inconsistency of prior research in terms of structural 
differences among courts (Cohen and Kleugal, 1975;
Stapleton and Smith, 1980; Stapleton and Teitelbaum, 1972; 
Thornberry, 1979). As mentioned before, the hypotheses 
central to the present research involve predictions of 
detention decision outcomes based on a juvenile court's
8structural and procedural characteristics.
All of the previously cited studies focus on determi­
nants of adjudicatory or disposition decisions in juvenile 
and adult criminal courts. The research on determinants 
of the detention decision in juvenile courts is also 
characterized by inconsistent findings. Sumner (19 70) 
analyzed detention decision outcomes in several California 
counties. Her objective was to determine whether certain 
legal or social factors are responsible for varying patterns 
of detention decisions. Sumner found that the following 
six variables were significantly related to detention:
1) prior court referrals; 2) type of prior offense history; 
3) history of prior detention; 4) history of previous pro­
bation; 5) referral as a runaway; 6) referral for incorrigi­
bility. Social variables that might work to bias the 
detention decision, such as race and socio-economic status, 
were found to be not significantly related to detention.
Cohen and Kleugal (1975), recognizing that the court 
systems included in Sumner's study lacked structural and 
geographical representativeness, examined the associations 
between various independent variables and detention in two 
geographically and structurally different metropolitan 
courts. These authors concluded that the variables most 
substantially related to detention in the two samples 
include present activity, prior record, and the orientation 
to juvenile justice represented in each court. They found 
no evidence of racial or social class bias. Some evidence
surfaced to suggest that a degree of sex bias existed in 
the handling of females charged with decorum offenses and 
males charged with property and violent offenses, however.
Dungworth (19 77) studied pre-adjudicatory detention 
in a juvenile court system in Michigan. Dungworth defined 
his cases as those charged with adult offenses and those 
charged with status offenses. Dungworth offered the follow­
ing findings: home factors are important only for status
offenders; age is a significant variable only for those 
charged with adult offenses; race is important only for 
status offenders; and sex of the offender is insignificant 
in both types of cases. Dungworth observed that, overall, 
his analyses indicate "a relatively high degree of rationality 
in decisions about felony and misdemeanor offenders, with 
non-offense characteristics being more important for 
decisions about the latter than about the former." Decisions 
regarding status offenders are found to be less rational 
(p. 43).
Finally, Pawlak (1977) looked at detention in sixty- 
six county courts in one (unidentified) state. The first 
stage of his analysis consisted of a comparison of courts 
with and without detention homes. Next, in those courts 
with a detention home, he examined the effects of prior 
court contacts, offense, sex, and race on detention. In 
this study Pawlak, like Dungworth, was unable to achieve 
the structural or geographical representation that Cohen 
and Kleugal noted as important.
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Among the findings of this study are that courts with­
out a detention home detained youths less often than did 
courts with a detention home, despite the fact that juveniles 
in the two samples were highly similar. Pawlak suggested 
that this may point to the needless detention of children in 
those courts with a detention facility. The findings indi­
cated that both social and legal variables affected the 
detention decision. Pawlak found that in those courts with 
a detention home, the number of previous court contacts was 
positively related to the likelihood of detention, and that 
white females and those committing status offenses were 
detained more frequently than other groups.
The Present Research
Several pieces of research reflect attempts to explain 
the inconsistency in prior research. In the present 
research, the attempt will be made to incorporate and build 
upon these previous efforts. For example, Cohen and Kleugal 
(1978) criticize earlier works for their reliance on simple 
bivariate analyses. I have chosen to use multiple regression 
analysis, a relatively sophisticated technique, as the means 
of testing my hypotheses. Also, my data were drawn from 
two court sites. Reliance on single court sites obviously 
limits generalizability. Further, the court sites were 
chosen to represent geographical and structural variation. 
Finally, the research is an effort to examine the effects of 
court structure on decision making and on detention decision
11
results.
The variables that I use to test the hypotheses have 
relevance to previous theoretical and substantive research.
I examine the detention process in the two courts using 
variables that reflect social characteristics of the juve­
niles as well as legal characteristics of their cases.
I have conceptualized social factors in terms of dis­
criminatory and discretionary variables following the 
suggestions of Horowitz and Wasserman (19 80). It has been 
suggested that the nature of juvenile court philosophy and 
its related structure result in decision making that is 
based on discriminatory variables such as age, sex, ethnicity, 
or socio-economic status, rather than on legally relevant 
factors (Platt 1969; Martin 1970; Schur 1971). I have 
chosen to use age, sex, and ethnicity as discriminatory 
variables here. Previous research has examined the effects 
of these variables on decisionmaking. Dungworth (1977) 
found that age may be a significant factor affecting the 
likelihood of detention for those youths charged with adult 
offenses. Arnold (1971), Thomas and Sieverdes (1973), and 
Thornberry (1973) each concluded that blacks were subjected 
to more severe sentencing than whites. And some researchers 
have found evidence suggesting that females are likely 
to receive harsher dispositions than males (for example,
Terry 1967a; Chused 1973; Pawlak 1973).
Discretionary social variables describe the character 
and social situation of an offender. The discretionary
12
variables used here include living situation and present 
activity. Previous researchers who have used living 
situation as an independent variable to examine juvenile 
court decision making (see for example, Arnold, 1971; 
Dungworth, 1977; and Thomas and Cage, 1977). Among those 
who have examined the effect of present activity on decision 
making are Cohen and Kleugal (1975) and Dungworth (1977).
I use three variables that reflect the legal character­
istics of juvenile cases. These variables include the 
number of previous court contacts, the number of offenses, 
and the type of offense with which a youth is charged.
Several researchers have found the number of previous court 
contacts to be significantly associated with detention (for 
example, Sumner 1970; Cohen and Kleugal 1975; Pawlak 1977) . 
Carter (1979) paid special attention to the effect of the 
number of offenses with which a juvenile is charged on court
decision making. Finally, each of the four studies that
were found to deal specifically with determinants of the
detention decision suggest that the type of offense that a
youth allegedly has committed is associated with detention 
decision outcomes (Sumner, 197 0; Cohen and Kleugal, 1975; 
Dungworth, 1977; Pawlak, 1977).
It is a guiding premise of this research that 
structural and procedural characteristics of courts are 
causally related to detention decisions. The empirical 
typology of metropolitan juvenile courts described by 
Stapleton, Aday, and Ito (American Journal of Sociology,
13
forthcoming) was used to identify contrasting courts. In 
order to facilitate understanding of the present research, 
it is necessary to view the major independent variable (the 
juvenile court or, more specifically, analytically relevant 




It is the basic thesis of this effort that procedural 
and structural characteristics of juvenile courts, as 
measured by the variable "court type," are causally related 
to the pre-adjudicatory detention decision. My conceptuali­
zation of court type is drawn from the work of Stapleton, 
Aday, and Ito (American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming). 
The researchers measured court type through five structural 
and procedural dimensions. Their research has resulted in 
an empirical typology through which modern metropolitan 
juvenile courts can be (and have been) placed according to 
these dimensions. The researchers note that variations in 
the structural and procedural characteristics of juvenile 
courts may reflect the ideal, polar types of the traditional 
and due process courts. They suggest that courts in the 
typology are not located along a single continuum, however, 
but are points in multidimensional space. The hypotheses 
tested here concern the effects of structural and procedural 
variations on detention decision making in samples from two 
courts that represent sharply different structural and proce­
dural characteristics. The two courts most closely approxi­




The empirical typology of metropolitan juvenile courts 
was developed from survey data collected as part of the 
Gault Project.^ The purpose of the Gault Project was to 
obtain reliable data describing the structural and procedural 
operations of modern metropolitan juvenile courts. Such 
data were especially needed because a number of judicial 
and executive initiatives (such as the' 1967 Supreme Court 
decision In re Gault) have produced important changes within 
the American juvenile justice system. A member of the project 
expressed the need for research noting, "It is urgent that 
juvenile justice experts know where they are, before plan­
ning where they should go. Evaluation of the efficiency, 
quality, or fairness of juvenile justice in the United States 
is not possible without a baseline for measurement"
(Stapleton 1980:3).
The survey data used in the construction of the 
empirical typology were collected by telephone from a 
saturated sample of 150 metropolitan juvenile courts. The 
interview schedule consisted of 203 distinct dichotomous 
variables that addressed both theoretical and practical con­
cerns of the Gault Project staff (see Stapleton, Aday and 
Ito, American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming). The survey 
data were entered into a factor analysis that allowed iden­
tification of five factors reflecting court structure and 
procedure. A variable was selected from each of the five 
factors as an indicator of the factor and entered into an 
agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis. The variables
were selected for inclusion in the cluster analysis on the 
basis of high loading in the factor analysis and conceptual 
clarity. The cluster analysis allowed identification of 12 
clusters of courts based on the criteria of maximal struct­
ural and procedural homogeneity and a minimum number of 
clusters. The polar types of the traditional and due process 
courts were drawn from two of the 12 clusters.
The typology isolates structural and procedural 
characteristics of courts that vary in such a way as to 
allow meaningful distinctions. There follows a brief dis­
cussion of the concepts of structure and procedure as these 
are measured in the typology and in the hypotheses of the 
present research. It should be noted that the central con­
cept in the typology and in this research is structure. How­
ever, because of measurement procedures used in the typology 
research, some of the dimensions are not obviously structural 
These refer to procedural characteristics that the authors 
believe to reflect structural variables (conversation with 
David Aday, October, 1981).
Organizational structure is defined by Peter Blau (1974 
12) as "the distributions, along various lines, of people 
among social positions that influence the role relations 
among these people." Perrow (1970: 56) expands on this
definition by noting that the structural viewpoint of 
organizations "considers the roles people play. It deals 
with the structure in which the roles are performed; the 
relationship of groups to each other; the degrees of centra­
lization (or the distribution of power); and the climate
of values and expectations and goals in the organization." 
Hall (1977) explains structure in terms of its functions, 
features, and determinants. He notes that the structure of 
an organization functions to control the effects of indivi­
dual heterogeneity. He notes also that structure serves as 
the arena in which the use of power, decision making, and 
other activities are conducted. According to Hall, the 
features of organizational structure include complexity, 
formalization, and centralization. Hall says that structure 
is known to be partially determined by factors such as 
the size of an organization; the type and level of techno­
logy with which the organization deals; the general social, 
political, and economic environment in which the organiza­
tion exists; and real as well as stated goals. A brief, 
but useful, definition of structure might be that it con­
sists of the roles existing in an organization and the 
normative and value systems supporting these roles. Proce­
dures, on the other hand, may be thought of as the methods 
through which organizational processes, including detention, 
are effected.
As mentioned, court type is measured using five
structural and procedural dimensions. The following five
structural and procedural dimensions were identified by
Stapleton, Aday, and Ito (American Journal of Sociology,
forthcoming) in creating their typology and are used here
2as the measures of court type.
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1. Status Orientation/Scope of Jurisdiction - This factor 
measures whether the court deals with status offenders and 
if so, the provisions that are made to deal with this type 
of offender. (Status offenses are those offenses which,
if they had been committed by an adult, would not have been 
criminal.) The factor involves the following aspects of 
status offender jurisdiction: "intake discretion to refer,
counsel, or release from detention, the use of nonjudicial 
conferences to adjust the case, notification of rights if 
a judicial hearing is to be held, and disposition options 
available after formal adjudicatiorf (Stapleton, Aday, and 
Ito (American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming:9).
2. Centralization of Authority - This factor measures 
variation in the extent to which a court maintains adminis­
trative control over probation and detention services, and 
the degree to which it is responsible for restitution pro­
grams. In a .court characterized by centralized authority, 
control is maintained by a judge and his or her administra­
tive officer(s). The authority may be strengthened through 
the control and distribution of organizational rewards, in­
cluding hiring and firing, promotions, and incentive rewards. 
Centralized authority is typically exercised on a personal 
basis. Probation or detention personnel in a centralized 
system are unlikely to belong to a union or to participate
in a merit system of appointment and promotion.
In a court characterized by decentralization of 
authority, functions such as probation or detention are
19
likely to be protected by a union and a merit system of 
appointment and promotion. Authority in the decentralized 
system is likely to be delegated and exercised on an 
impersonal basis.
3. Formalization - This factor measures variation in 
structural formality. As such, it describes the extent to 
which adjudication and disposition hearings are bifurcated. 
The factor also reveals how social information may be used 
at adjudicatory hearings. This is of interest because the 
use of social information at adjudicatory hearings has been 
contested by those who feel that it may hinder due process 
procedures and prejudice legal cases.
4. Differentiation/Task Specialization - The fourth dimen­
sion reflects a measure of the extent to which a juvenile 
court functions separately from the rest of the judicial 
system. Traditional juvenile justice generally has not been 
seen as integrated with the rest of the judicial system 
(IJA/ABA Standards 1977a). Appeals in the traditional sys­
tem, for example, usually are held de novo in a court of 
higher trial jurisdiction rather than on direct appeal 
(Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, American Journal of Sociology, 
forthcoming). This factor also measures the degree of
task specialization. The judge in the juvenile court 
traditionally has functioned as judge, defense attorney, 
and prosecutor. At the other end of the spectrum, these 
roles are clearly delineated and observed by court personnel 
in the court that is characterized by the due process 
orientation to juvenile justice.
20
5. Intake Discretion - Intake discretion refers to the 
authority of the intake or probation staff to impose un­
official (and nonjudicial) probation or restitution. Such 
discretion is normally exercised in courts that maintain a 
traditional, social service approach and view their task as 
nonpunitive in character (Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, American 
Journal of Sociology, forthcoming). Informal probation or 
restitution may also serve as a system of early diversion 
in which juveniles are prescreened for formal court appear­
ance .
Among the types of courts that emerge using the five 
structural and procedural dimensions were one approximating 
the ideal-typical traditional court and one that represents 
the ideal-typical "due process" court. The traditional 
court is characterized by the inclusion of status offenders 
in its jurisdiction, centralized authority, lack of forma­
lization, low differentiation/task specification (e.g., no 
prosecutorial involvement in the decision to file formal 
action in a case) and low intake discretion. These charac­
teristics are consistent with the nature of the traditional 
court as it has been described in previous literature. The 
traditional court generally has been characterized as "all- 
inclusive" in that the court (and typically the judge) main­
tains control from intake through disposition of cases 
(Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, American Journal of Sociology, 
forthcoming!) . It is further characterized by cooperation 
among staff participants and a concern for the interests of
21
the child. The doctrine of parens patriae is central to 
the philosophy and operating style of the traditional 
court. Handler (1965) notes that this concept is the 
"theoretical underpinning for the rejection of (adult) 
criminal law adversary procedures." He points out that 
the issues surrounding delinquents are not criminal 
responsibility, guilt, and punishment, but rather under­
standing, guidance, and protection. Youths are seen as not 
fully responsible for their conduct and are seen as capable 
of being rehabilitated (Davis 1974).
Several schools of thought attempt to explain the
3.foundations of traditional juvenile justice. Anthony 
Platt is a principal advocate of the "revisionist" school. 
This view focuses on the importance of political maneuver­
ing and the protection of vested interests in the genesis 
of the traditional juvenile court. The revisionist school -
sees a separate juvenile justice system as resulting from
societal attempts to revise and strengthen informal policies 
that were "not so much a break with the past as an affirma­
tion of faith in certain aspects of the past (Platt 1969:
139)." Platt suggests that parental authority, home educa­
tion, domesticity, and rural values were emphasized and 
reinforced because they were in decline at the time. Members 
of the revisionist school also maintain that proponents of 
a juvenile court system desired to obtain legal legitimacy 
for the achievement of their own vested interests. The 
interests may have included the preservation of middle class
22
values and facilitating the growing movement for women's 
political rights (Faust and Brantingham 1974).
Stapleton and Teitelbaum (1972) suggest that three 
interconnected points of scientific positivism were influ- 
encial in shaping the traditional philosophy of the court:
1) The court system should focus its attention 
on the actor rather than on the substance or ad­
ministration of criminal law;
2) scientific determinism was substituted for the 
classical doctrine of free will in attempts to 
understand delinquency causation;
3) and, the delinquent was seen as different from 
the non-delinquent; this difference, whether it 
was social, genetic, or cultural, was seen as the 
cause of criminality (Matza 1964).
Samuel Davis (1974) suggests that the traditional 
juvenile court was a by-product of the "sociological juris­
prudence" movement. Members of this movement saw the law 
simply as a means for attaining certain social ends. A 
tenet of sociological jurisprudence was that the law should 
be infused with knowledge from the social sciences. It was 
felt that because delinquency is a social phenomenon, reclama­
tion of children logically should occur through application 
of the tools of the social sciences rather than through 
recourse to criminal process.
Finally, others have suggested that the "humanitarian- 
ism" school of thought affected the emergence and philosophy 
of the court. "Humanitarians" felt that the facilities used
23
to incarcerate youths were inadequate because their only 
known good was that of punishment. They also felt that 
the measures invoked to punish juveniles had no noticeable 
effect on reducing the crime rate. Those who assumed the 
forefront in thepublic fight to create a separate juvenile 
justice system consisted largely of lawyers, religious 
leaders, social workers, and others who objected to the 
treatment of youthful law violators as adult criminals.
A contemporary and contrasting model of juvenile jus­
tice is that described by Packer (1968) as "due process."
The due process type of court is characterized by decentra­
lization of authority (e.g., the court does not administer 
probation) and high differentiation and task specification 
(e.g., the prosecutor is involved in the decision to file 
a petition). These characteristics resemble those found in
the criminal justice model described by Eisenstein and  --
Jacob (1977) . The model reflects a philosophy that high­
lights procedural guarantees and an organization in which 
the court operates as an association of workgroups that 
share a common ideology. It is suggested, however, that the 
day to day activities of the workgroups are structured by 
their participation in various "sponsoring" organizations 
(such as the judiciary, the prosecutor's office, and the 
public defender's office) (Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, American 
Journal of Sociology, forthcoming; cf. Eisenstein and Jacob, 
1977). The authority of the judge is relatively limited 
in this criminal justice model. This is due to the fact
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that the judge does not maintain administrative or budgetary 
control over the courtroom workgroups. The court selected 
to represent the due process model also reflects the dimen­
sional characteristics of status offense jurisdiction^and 
intake discretion.
The due process philosophy of juvenile justice focuses 
on a concern with legally guaranteed due process rights 
and procedures. The concern is manifested in a decentral­
ized, adversarial system in which there is a restricted in­
formation flow and precise rules for adjudication (Packer 
1968). Barollis and Miller (1978:173) describe the due pro­
cess theme by saying that it "presumes neither guilt nor 
need; it presumes the innocence of the child as its primary 
concern in the establishment of accuracy and fairness in 
the juvenile court process. In short, due process philoso­
phy is fearful that decisions of the juvenile court will be 
based on imperfect or inaccurate handling."
The multidimensionality among modern juvenile courts 
may perhaps be explained by the "open systems" organizational 
perspective. The perspective is usefully summarized by 
Katz and Kahn (1966). They eschew the classical view of 
organizations as insular systems removed from and unaffected 
by external environmental forces. They propose instead 
that organizations are heavily dependent upon the outside 
environment. They suggest that systems maintain themselves 
through constant commerce with their environment. This 
takes the form of a continuous inflow and outflow of energy,
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in which the (open) system "reacts to external events 
and adapts to strain through the gradual introduction 
of new elements to reduce strain."
Changes in juvenile court structures and procedures 
since the Gault decision suggest that the juvenile court 
operates as an "open system." The Gault decision mandated 
that the services of defense attorneys be made available 
to juveniles. It did not specify the nature of the 
defense attorney's role, however. Studies have shown that 
substantial role conflict may occur when an adversarial 
defense attorney enters a system and that system does not 
adapt its other elements to a conflict or adversarial 
mode of adjudication (Stapleton and Teitelbaum, 1972;
Clarke and Koch, 1980) . Studies dealing with the expanded 
role of the prosecutor in the due process court (for 
example, Rubin, 1980) indicate that the introduction of a —  
more active prosecutorial role may serve as an adaptive 
move that reduces the role strain of a judge who had func­
tioned as both prosecutor and judge before the defense at­
torney entered the system as an effective part of the pro­
cess .
The open systems perspective may also be used to pre­
dict the nature and direction of change in juvenile 
justice (Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, American Journal of 
Sociology, forthcoming). It is suggested that judicial 
and legislative mandates regarding juvenile courts increas­
ingly will reflect the due process philosophy. These
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mandates (such as the Supreme Court decision Iri re Gault 
will result in structural and procedural changes that 
also are consistent with the due process orientation. It 
is predicted, for example, that courts increasingly will 
exhibit features such as exclusion of status offenders 
from the court jurisdiction, decentralization of authority, 
formalization of procedures, task specificaion and 




The hypotheses tested here are guided by the theore­
tical premise that the structural and procedural charac­
teristics of juvenile courts (i.e., court type) are related 
causally to the pre-adjudicatory detention decision. In 
order to test the hypotheses, I will analyze data that 
describe case characteristics and detention decisions in 
two courts that approximate the traditional and due process 
ideal types. The courts were identified through the empiri­
cal typology of metropolitan juvenile courts developed by 
Stapleton, Aday, and Ito (American Journal of Sociology, 
forthcoming). The courts are located in the typology 
according to their structural and procedural characteristics. 
The case data were collected as part of the same research 
that led to the development of the empirical typology (the 
Gault Project). The data describe social and legal charac­
teristics, case processing activities, and the detention 
outcomes of approximately 2 50 cases in each of the two 
ideal-typical courts.
The hypotheses of this research concern the relation­
ship between the structural and procedural characteristics
27
28
of juvenile courts and the determinants of pre-adjudica­
tory detention decisions. I hypothesize that in the tradi­
tional court type, social variables are significant deter­
minants of detention decision outcomes, and in a court 
representing the due process court type, variables des­
cribing legal characteristics of juvenile cases are signifi­
cant determinants of detention decision outcomes. Again, 
the hypotheses will be tested through the analysis of case
data collected in each court.
The case data were obtained during site visits and 
were drawn from probation files, court dockets, and other 
court records. The samples were drawn by selecting approxi­
mately every eleventh case received at intake during a one 
year period (October 31, 1978 to September 1, 1979).
Each sample was stratified by sex during case selection to
assure a representative proportion of females for later 
analyses.
The research instrument was used to gather information 
on social characteristics of juveniles, legal characteris­
tics of their cases, case processing activities, and the 
outcomes of the cases. Appendix A contains the codebook 
of variables described by the collected data. Detention 
decision outcomes, of course, constitute the dependent 
variable of the present research. The various social and 
legal characteristics of the cases are the independent 
variables.
I used a dummying procedure on those independent
29
variables that originally reflected nominal level data in 
order to make the variables amenable to analysis as inter­
val level data. Multiple regression is the principal 
analytic procedure and normally requires interval level 
data. Nie, et al. (1975:5) note that any dichotomy can
be treated as though it were an interval level measure.
I have delineated the social variables in terms of the 
discretionary and discriminatory concept suggested by 
Horowitz and Wasserman (1980). As discussed, discriminatory 
variables traditionally have been used to test assumptions 
of bias. The discriminatory social variables used here 
are age, sex, and ethnicity. Age is measured using the 
following categories: 7-13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 years of
age. Sex and ethnicity are coded dichotomously, with ethni­
city measured as white and nonwhite. Discretionary social 
variables reflect the character and social situation of a 
juvenile. The discretionary social variables used here in­
clude living situation and present activity. The living 
situation of a juvenile is measured using the following 
categories: living with both parents, living with one
parent and a step-parent, living with a single parent, 
living with some other relative, or living in a non-relative 
home.. Activity is measured in terms of whether the youth 
is a full-time student or is involved in some "other" activity. 
I have used three measures that describe the legal charac­
teristics of cases. The number of offenses is measured 
as single or multiple offenses. The number of times a
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juvenile previously has come into contact with the court 
is measured as none^ or one or more times. And, the type 
of offense with which a youth is charged is classified as 
an "other", vice, status, or property offense, or an offense 
against persons (see Appendix B for a description of offense 
types).
Multiple regression serves as the principal analytic 
technique of this research. The regression analyses 
give an indication of the relative contributions of 
variables to the combination of variables that best explains 
variation in detention decision outcomes. The findings 
produced in the regression analyses are compared across 
the two court samples in order to test the hypotheses. The 
data are examined also through frequency distributions and 
through bivariate crosstabulations of the independent 
variables with detention. These examinations are used to — . 
describe the data as well as to reveal variations in case 
characteristics that may affect the detention decision re­
gardless of the court's structural and procedural charac­
teristics . The independent variables were examined also
through their intercorrelations. This examination was con-
5ducted in order to test for multicollmeanty. Instances




The present chapter contains the results of the ana­
lyses used in hypothesis testing. Again, it is the basic 
thesis that court type, as measured by certain structural 
and procedural characteristics of metropolitan juvenile 
courts, is a major determining factor affecting the pre­
adjudicatory detention decision. The following hypotheses 
were tested:
1) Social variables are significant deter­
minants of detention decisions in the 
traditional juvenile court.
2) Legal variables are significant deter­
minants of detention in the due process 
oriented court.
The analyses began with simple frequency distribu­
tions and bivariate crosstabulations and culminated with 
multiple regression analysis. This statistical technique 
served as the principal method of hypothesis testing. It 
involved using twelve social and legal independent 
variables and the variable of court type to explain varia­
tion in the pre-adjudicatory detention decision.
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In the present study there are variations in the 
case characteristics of the samples that may be related 
to and that may affect the detention decision independent 
of court type. Instances of this variation will be dis­
cussed in the following sections.
Frequencies and Bivariate Crosstabulations
The frequency distributions of each of the indepen­
dent variables provided a view of the characteristics of 
cases in the two samples. Chi square tests were used to 
identify significant differences in frequency distributions 
across samples. Chi square tests also were used to identi­
fy the variables that are systematically related to deten­
tion at the bivariate level. To the extent that case 
characteristics reflect significant variation across or 
within samples, the efficacy of" the research design for 
testing the effects of court type as a variable explaining 
detention must be questioned.
The frequency distributions of each of the indepen­
dent variables and the dependent variable are contained 
in Appendix C. The frequencies of four independent 
variables differed significantly in the two samples. The 
variables include: activity (measured as full-time student
or other), the number of previous court contacts, age of 
the juvenile at the time of the offense, and type of 
offense (measured as "other, vice, status, property,
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offenses against persons; see Appendix B for a description 
of offense types). The proportion of youths whose activity 
was classified as other than full-time student is roughly 
twice as great in the due process court as in the tradi­
tional court. These rates are 47.2 percent and 23.4 per­
cent, respectively. The proportion of youths with one or 
more previous court contacts varied significantly between 
the samples. Thirty-nine and one half percent of the 
youths sampled in the traditional court had one or more 
previous court contacts. This is in contrast to the due 
process court, where only 16.5 percent of the juveniles had 
any previous court contact. The traditional court sample 
contained a significantly larger number of older youths 
(youths 17 and 18 years old) than the due process court 
sample. Approximately 21.4 percent of the youths included 
in the traditional sample were 17 or 18 year olds. Only 
10.9 percent of the sample cases' fell into this category 
in the due process court. Finally, the frequencies of 
three categories of offense type differed significantly 
between samples. The categories are "other," vice, and 
status offenses. The direction of differences was not 
uniform, however. The proportion of "other" offenses was 
approximately three times as great in the traditional 
sample as in the due process sample (23.4 percent and 8.5 
percent, respectively). The proportion of vice offenses 
in the due process court was double that found in the 
traditional court (9.3 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively).
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Cases involving status offenses were almost twice as 
frequent in the due process sample as in the traditional 
court (35.5 percent and 18.1 percent, respectively).
The bivariate crosstabulations in each court between 
each of the independent variables and detention are con­
tained in Tables I and II. As can be seen, four indepen­
dent variables reflect significant bivariate relationships 
with the dependent variable in both samples. These are 
the four variables that were significantly different in 
frequency across the samples. These variables may affect 
the detention decisions in the two samples regardless of 
court type. The variables thus require further examination.
Those youths whose activity is categorized as "other" 
were significantly more likely to face detention in both 
the traditional and the due process court sample. This 
suggests that the activity of a juvenile may be a factor 
that affects detention regardless of court structure. 
Previous research (for example, Cohen and Kleugal 1975) 
suggests that present activity, especially being idle, 
is substantially related to the pre-adjudicatory detention 
decision. This finding diminishes the capacity in the 
current research to ascribe differences in detention out­
comes to the independent variable (court type).
Juveniles with one or more previous court contacts 
are detained significantly more often in both courts.
Again, because this association occurs in the traditional 
as well as the due process sample, court structure
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TABLE I
BIVARIATE CROSSTABULATIONS OF ALL 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH DETENTION
Traditional Court
Not
Variable Name Total Detained ' Detained
Social Variables
Age
7-13 33 (13.3) 17 (.51) 16 (.48)
14 32 (12.9) 14 (.44) 18 (.56)
15 70 (28.2) 40 (.57) 30 (.43)
16 57 (23.0) 26 (.47) 31 (.53)
17-18 53 (21.4) 27 (.51) 36 (.48)
245 124 121
Sex
Male 174 (70.6) 95 (.55) 78 (.45)
Female 72 (29.4) 29 (.40) 43 (. 60)
246 124 121
Ethnicity
White 164 (66.9) 85 (.52) 79 (.48)
Non-.white 79 (32.2) 38 (.48) 41 (.52)
243 123 120
♦Activity —
Full-time student 188 (76.7)- 88 (.47) 100 (.53)





Both Parents 83 (34.3) 39 (.47) 44 (.53)
Parent and step­
parent 31 (12.8) 19 (.61) 12 (.39)
Single Parent 101 (41.7) 50 (.49) 51 (.50)
Other Relative 15 ( 6.2) 9 (.60) 6 (.40)




Single 216 (88.3) 105 (.49) 111 (.51)
Multiple 29 (11.7) 19 (.66) 10 (.34)
245 124 121
♦Offense
"other" 55 (22.4) 27 (.49) 28 (.51)
Vice 10 ( 4.1) 7 (.70) 1 (.30)
Status 45 (18.4) 16 (.36) 29 (.64)
Property 101 (42.4) 59 (.57) 45 (.43)




None 149 (60.8) 63 (.42) 86 (.58)
One or More 96 (39.2) 61 (.64) 35 (.36)
245 124 121
Total 124 (50.0) 121 (48.8)
(Missing) 3 (1.2)
♦Significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance.
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TABLE II
BIVARIATE CROSSTABULATIONS OF ALL 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH DETENTION
Due Process Court












































































































































Total 40 (16.1) 203 (81.9)
(Missing) 3 (1.2)
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obviously is not the only variable accounting for deten­
tion practices in the courts. It should also be noted 
that previous research (for example, Sumner 19 70; Cohen 
and Kleugal 1975; Pawlak 1977) has produced findings con­
sistent with this observed association.
Type of offense is also associated somewhat indepen­
dently with the detention decision. Tables I and II 
reveal that in both court samples, being a status offender 
is negatively associated with detention. In fact, those 
charged with status offenses have the lowest possibility 
of being detained in both samples, with the proportion of 
status offenders who are detained being almost zero in the 
due process sample (.03 percent). Aside from status 
offenses, type of offense is not significantly associated 
with detention in the traditional sample. In the due 
process court, however, being charged with an "other" 
offense or a property offense is significantly and posi­
tively associated with detention. That three of the five 
offense types are significantly associated with detention 
in the due process sample is congruent with the hypothesis 
that legal variables are the most important factors 
affecting detention in this court.
The bivariate analyses revealed that in the due 
process court, being 16 years old is significantly 
associated in a positive direction with detention. This 
finding does not support the hypothesis that legal 
variables are the significant determinants of detention
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in the due process oriented court. The finding is, how­
ever, supported by previous research. Dungworth (1977) 
found that older youths committing adult offenses faced 
a greater likelihood of detention. The effect of age in 
the traditional court sample is not clear.
Correlation Coefficients and 
Multiple Regression Analysis
Appendix D contains the intercorrelation matrices 
for all independent variables and the dependent variable 
in each sample. Pearson's product-moment correlation 
coefficients were used to test for multicollinearity. 
Correlations among independent variables above .7 were- inter­
preted as reflecting multicollinearity.
An examination of the intercorrelations among indepen­
dent variables revealed that seven variables covaried sub­
stantially in the traditional court sample and nine 
variables covaried substantially in the due process 
court sample. One pair of independent variables, family 
composition and living situation, appeared... to reflect 
multicollinearity in both samples. I chose to eliminate 
family composition from the analyses of both courts in 
order to avoid problems of interpreting regression coeffi­
cients. Family composition and living situation measured 
similar aspects of a juvenile's home environment. I felt 
that living situation would serve as the better indicator 
because it dealt directly with the juvenile's home
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environment at the time of intake.
Multiple Regression Analysis
I have chosen to use multiple regression analysis 
as the principal method of hypothesis testing. Previous 
literature suggests that this level of statistical sophis­
tication is necessary in research dealing with factors 
affecting pre-adjudicatory detention decisions (see, for 
example, Cohen and Kleugal, 1975). Multiple regression 
analysis allowed me to view the independent effects of 
each predictor variable while taking into account the con­
trolled cumulative effects of the remaining variables.
It also produced an equation that revealed the combination 
of independent variables that is most potent in explaining 
or predicting variation in the dependent variable.
The results of the regression analysis of the 
traditional court data are found in Table III. The results 
should be interpreted in light of earlier discussions 
of the variations of case characteristics within and 
between courts.
Variables were considered substantively important 
in the regression analysis if they explained at least 1 
percent of the variance in detention decision outcomes.
Five independent variables explain a significant amount 
of variation in this sample of cases. The variables 
include, in descending order according to the amount of 
variation they explained: number of previous court
contacts; property offenses; number of offenses; vice
offenses; and activity. The variables reflect a
combined explained variance of approximately 13 percent
(R2 = 0.13005).
The F scores of three predictor variables indicate
significant independent associations with detention.
According to these scores, detention is significantly
associated with having come into contact with the court
on one or more occasions (B = -0.23614); having been
charged with multiple offenses (B = -0.13721); and not being
5a full time student (activity; B = 0.13547).
The three variables exhibiting significant indepen­
dent associations with detention consist of two legal 
variables and a discretionary social variable. That the 
detention decision in this court appears to be based upon 
legal variables is not congruent with the hypothesis that— - 
social variables would predominate as determinants of 
detention in the traditional court sample.
"Select" regression analyses of both samples were 
also conducted. These analyses used only those indepen­
dent variables that explained at least 1 percent of the 
variance in detention in the initial analyses. The purpose 
of the select analyses was to examine the stability of 
the initial regression findings. Table IV reveals that 
in the traditional court sample the select variables
explain approximately 10 percent of the variance in the
2dependent variable (R = .09962). Approximately 13 percent
TABLE III
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALL 
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SELECTED 
VARIABLES ON DETENTION 
Traditional Court
Variable Name r B
RSQ
Change F
*Number of Previous (L) 
Court Contacts -0.20758 -0.24537 0.04309 17.350
Property Offenses (L) -0.10510 -0.16349 0.02230 5.54 8
Vice Offenses (L) -0.07999 -0.29433 0.01403 3.714
Number of Offenses (L) -0.10924 -0.17118 0.01355 3.585
Activity (S) 0.13817 0.98527 0.00665 2.410
(S) = Social Variable (L) = Legal Variable 
DF = 4 
F = 6.15015




of the variance in the dependent variable was explained
when all of the predictor variables were entered into the
2regression equation (R = .13005). A drop of only three 
percent from the initially explained variance suggests 
that the relationships reflected in the initial regression 
analyses are relatively stable (i.e., they reflect systema­
tic variation).
The ordering of variables according to Beta weights 
changed somewhat in the select regression analysis. Most 
notably, the number of previous court contacts exhibited 
the strongest Beta weight in the select analysis. In fact, 
this was the only variable in the select equation to 
exhibit a significant Beta Weight. The amount of variance 
explained by this variable is relatively large in both the 
initial and select regression runs. The analyses all point 
to the conclusion that the number of previous court con­
tacts does, in fact, reflects the strongest independent 
association with detention. This finding matches that of 
most of the previous research on .determinants of juvenile 
court detention decisions (Sumner 1970; Cohen and Kleugal 
1975; Pawlak 1977).
The results of the initial regression analysis of 
the due process court sample data are represented in Table 
V. Five independent variables explain at least 1 percent 
of the variance in detention. The variables jointly 
explain about 33 percent of the
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variance m  the dependent variable (R = .33045). It is
important to note that this is in sharp contrast to the
traditional court sample, where all the independent
variables explained only about 13 percent of the variance
2in the initial regression run (R = .13005).
The substantively important variables here include, 
in the order with greatest explanatory power: number of
previous court contacts, living situation, status offenses, 
activity, and number of offenses. Two predictor variables 
(property offenses and gender) made only minimal contribu­
tion to explained variance and thus were excluded completely 
from the final regression equation.
The F distributions produced in this run indicate 
that three of the predictor variables have significant 
Beta weights. Detention appears to be significantly 
associated with having had one or more previous court con­
tacts (B = -0.31722); living with relatives other than 
parents or in non-relative homes (living situation; B = 
0.25774). The significant variables consist of two legal 
variables and one discretionary social variable. This 
finding tends to support the hypothesis that legal variables 
predominate as determinants of detention in the due process 
oriented court sample.
The variables included in the select regression 
analysis of the due process court sample (see Table VI)
explained approximately 30 percent of the variation in
2the detention decision (R = .30795). The initial analysis
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TABLE V
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALL 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON DETENTION
Due Process Court
Variable Name r B
RSQ
Change F
*Number of Previous (L) 
Court Contacts -0.38408 -0.32416 0.14751 29.111
*Living Situation (S) -0.28460 -0.38980 0.05928 12.391
*Status Offenses (L) 0.28436 0.20335 0.04625 16.353
Activity (S) 0.16972 0.16181 0.05083 11.338
Number of Offenses (L) -0.21518 -0.13616 0.02166 5.978
"Other" Offenses (L) -0.18002 -0.58599 0.00243 0.633
Crimes Against Persons (L) 0.00355 0.50656 0.00132 0.329
Ethnicity (S) 0.03073 -0.23514 0.00072 0.198
Age (S) -0.11931 -0.30872 0.00022 0.070
Vice Offenses (L) 0.00355 - 0.22255 0.00023 0.043
(S) = Social Variable (L) = Legal Variable 
DF = 9 
F = 9.8741









Variable Name r  B Change -___F
*Number of Previous (L)
Court Contacts -0.36760 -0.29593 0.13491 30.105
Living Situation (S) -0.28407 -0.38851 0.06061 13.405
Status Offenses (L) 0.28332 0.20549 0.04839 21.379
Activity (S) 0.17117 0.17260 0.04786 14.934
Number of Offenses (L) -0.20406 0.98216 0.01618 16.814
(S) = Social Variable (L) = Legal Variable
DF = 4
F = 22.76118 
RSQ = 0.30795
*Variables demonstrating significant independent effects on the 
detention decision
explained about 33 percent of the variation in the deten-
2tion decision (R = .33045). Overall, the relationships 
among the significant independent variables and between 
these variables and detention appear to be stable. The 
only variable with a significant Beta weight in this 
analysis was the number of previous court contacts. This 
finding is the same as that in the traditional court 
sample and is consistent with the findings of most of the 
previous research dealing with the determinants of pre­
adjudicatory detention. The ordering of variables in the 
explanatory equation remained unchanged in the select 
analysis.
In a final regression analysis I combined the cases 
of both samples (N = 497) and entered court type as an 
additional independent variable. The purpose of this 
analysis was to examine the effects of court type indepen-__ 
dent of, and in interaction with, the other independent 
variables. I fully expected court type to emerge as the 
major variable in the regression equation of this analysis, 
given the differences in case characteristics and detention 
outcomes of the samples.
Table VII contains the results of the analysis. Court
type accounted for nearly half of the total explained 
2variation (R = 0.12661). The F score for the variable 
reveals that the strength of its association with detention 
was more than twice that of the next strongest independent 
variable. As predicted, the findings support the thesis
4 8
that determinants of detention may be predicted according 
to court type.
In a final exercise I examined the patterns among 
the variables throughout the step-wise regression analysis of 
both courts. The purpose of this examination was to ascertain 
the stability of the coefficients in the final regression 
equation. Very briefly, the examination revealed that the 
coefficients were in fact stable throughout the regression 
analyses of both sets of data. The complete step-wise 
regression analyses of both court samples are contained in 
Appendix E.
Summary
Certain qualifications exist with regard to the find­
ings produced in the regression analyses. The qualifications 
refer to instances of significant differences in the case 
characteristics of the samples. Interpretation of 
the findings should be made considering the possibility 
that these differences may affect detntion decision out­
comes regardless of court structure.
At best, the data provide only partial support for the 
hypotheses. It was hypothesized that social variables 
would be significant determinants of detention in the
traditional juvenile court. The analyses reveal, however,
that the combination of two legal variables reveal, however,
that the combination of two legal variables and a dis­
cretionary social variable was most predictive of deten­
tion decisions. It was found that detention in the tradi­
tional court sample was significantly associated with
TABLE VII
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALL VAIRABLES 
AND COURT TYPE ON DETENTION
RSQ
Variable Name r B Change F
*Court type -0.35582 -0.34137 0.12661 57.553
♦Number of Previous (L) 
Court Contacts -0.33526 -0.22933 0.06482 27.620
Status Offenses (L) 0.2514 3 0.35131 0.02459 0.833
♦Activity (S) 0.05934 0.16361 0.02416 13.387
Number of Offenses (L) -0.11470 -0.13569 0.01597 10.862
Living Situation (S) -0.11186 -0.10515 0.00858 6.459
Property Offenses (L) -0.13175 0.19953 0.00552 0.215
Vice Offenses (L) -0.00501 0.08122 0.00386 0.147
Gender (S) -0.16629 -0.06543 0.00332 2.240
Age (S) -0.10409 0.02486 0.00046 0.333
Ethnicity (S) -0.02030 -0.01110 0.00012 0.070
"Other" Offenses (L) -0.10495 0.23660 0.00011 0.533
Offenses Against Persons
(L) -0.00986 0.18490 0.00078 0.483
(S) = Social Variable (L) = Legal Variable
DF = 13
F = 13.35704
♦Variables demonstrating significant independent effects on the
detention decision 
RSQ = .278 8 8
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having come into contact with the court on one or more
previous occasions, having been charged with multiple
offenses, and not being a full-time student. Approximately
10 percent of the variation in the dependent variable
was explained by the select regression equation of this 
2
sample (R = .09962).
The findings tend to support the hypothesis that 
legal variables are the significant determinants in 
the due process court sample. The analyses showed that 
the detention decision was best predicted by a combination 
of two legal variables and a discretionary variable. Deten­
tion appears to be significantly related to having had 
one or more previous court contacts, living with relatives 
other than parents or in non-relative homes, and having 
committed offenses other than status offenses. The amount 
of variance explained in the select regression equation 
was approximately thirty percent, three times that explained 
in the select analysis of the traditional court sample 
(R2 = .30759).
It is important to note that no indications of dis­
criminatory decision making was evident in either court.
The analyses revealed that none of the discriminatory 
social variables (sex, gender, age) was- significantly v 
associated with the detention decision.. This finding is, 
of course, contrary to that previous literature which 




The findings of previous research dealing with 
juvenile court decision making in general, and the pre- 
adjudicatory detention decision in particular, are in­
consistent. Researchers have found that the social 
characteristics of juveniles and the legal characteristics 
of cases have variable causal significance to the deten­
tion decision.
The present research attempted to test empirically 
hypothesized relationships between the structure of 
juvenile courts and the pre-adjudicatory detention deci­
sion. Previous research has failed to consider adequately 
the role that court structure may play in decision making. 
Relevant characteristics of court structure and procedure 
have been defined and specified in an empirical typology of 
metropolitan juvenile courts (Stapleton, Aday and Ito, American 
Journal of Sociology, forthcoming). In the present effort I 
hypothesized that social variables are the significant determi­
nants of detention in a traditional court and that legal 
variables are significant determinants, of detention in a "due 
process" court.
The hypotheses were only partially supported by the
51
52
findings. The analyses failed to support the hypothesis
that social variables are the significant determinants
of detention in the traditional juvenile court. It was
found instead that legal variables were predominantly
associated with the decision to detain in this sample.
The findings did support the prediction that legal
variables predominate as determinants of detention in the
due process court.
While the analyses do not wholly support the original
hypotheses, alternative hypotheses are suggested that are
congruent with the original expectations regarding the
nature and effect of court structure and procedure on
detention decision making.
The predictor variables explain approximately 30
percent of the variance in the detention decision in the
2
due process court (select R = .30759). This is approxi­
mately three times the amount of variance explained in
2the traditional court (select R = .09962). It is hypo­
thesized that the substantially larger amount of variation 
explained in the due process court indicates the operation 
of patterned and regularized, if implicit, criteria 
that affect the detention decision. It is further hypo­
thesized that these criteria operate to constrain deten­
tion decision making in the due process court. This 
constraint is further suggested by the rate of detention 
(approximately 16 percent). I would suggest that the 
predictability characterizing the detention decision in
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the due process court reflects the structural and proce­
dural characteristics of the court (for example, decen­
tralization of authority and high differentiation/task 
specification).
Decentralization of authority is sometimes a concomit 
ant of increased complexity in an organization. Perrow 
(1979) notes that rules emerge in an organization when 
complexity increases. I would suggest that rules have 
emerged in the due process court that are associated with 
increased complexity and decentralization and that those 
rules result in patterned and more predictable detention 
decision outcomes.
Decentralization of authority as it relates to pre­
adjudicatory detention is evident in the due process 
court in several ways. Detention personnel exhibit 
autonomy in their participation in a union and a merit 
system of appointment and promotion. Also, the court 
does not maintain administrative control over detention 
services. The detention unit is funded and administered 
by an agency outside the court. Finally, the delegation 
of authority in the due process court reflects decentra­
lized power. The detention decision is made by the judge 
presiding at the time the detention decision arises.
Judges charged with making the detention decision are 
assigned by a chief judge and are rotated every three 
to six months.
The decentralized nature of authority in the due
process court reflects some of the characteristics of a 
classical bureaucracy. Weber said that authority in 
bureaucracies is "rational-legal", based on legally 
enacted, rational rules that are considered legitimate 
by all members (Weber in Perrow 1979: 82). Authority in 
the due process court, as manifested in detention decision 
making, is exercised on this basis as well. I hypothesize 
that detention decision making in the court is governed by 
-relatively defined, rational rules and that the use of 
these rules translates into patterned and regularized 
detention decision making. The use of highly personalized 
criteria in detention decision making is anthithetical 
to the philosophy and practice of the due process 
. court.
The structural and procedural characteristics of 
high differentiation and task specification in the due 
process court are indicated in the following ways: the
roles of judge, defense attorney, and prosecutor are 
are distinct and are apparent and important to court 
personnel; appeals usually may be made within the court 
and do not have to go to a court of higher trial juris­
diction; and the prosecutor (rather than a judge alone) 
participates in the decision to file a petition requesting 
that the court handle a case formally (Stapleton, Aday, 
and Ito, American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming).
The high differentiation and task specification in 
the due process court reflect formal adversarial (or due
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process) procedures. The adversarial ideology reflects 
a concern with the act that allegedly has been committed, 
rather than with the juvenile. Adversarial procedures 
are designed to limit information used in adjudicating 
a case to that which is legally relevant (Stapleton,
Aday, and Ito, American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming). 
The procedures related to the detention decision in the 
due process court are formalized and adversarial in 
nature. They are regally prescribed and function as well 
established parts of the court system. Formalized proce­
dures virtually require that regularized and patterned 
criteria be used in detention decision making. The use 
of criteria other than these would be incompatible with 
the organizational and ideological nature of the court.
The high differentiation and task specification in 
the due process court are evidenced by separate and rela­
tively autonomous workgroups. The workgroups perform 
different functions within the court organizational frame­
work and thus maintain different independent goals. The 
workgroup dealing with pre-adjudicatory detention decisions 
is no exception. It is suggested that the varying goals 
of court workgroups and the different criteria that are 
used by the workgroups in accomplishing these goals produce 
a need for predictability (e.g., the operation of criteria 
of decision making). This predictability is necessary 
in all facets of court organization, including detention 
decision making, and leads to detention decision making
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that is made according to patterned and consistent 
criteria.
It appears that detention decisions are far less 
predictable in the traditional court. Support for this 
is found in the fact that only 11 percent of the variance 
could be explained by the independent variables. The 
variability in decision making occurs in the context of 
a relatively high rate of detention (50 percent; the 
rate of detention in the due process court was 16.1 per­
cent) . The small amount of explained variance in the 
traditional court may result from the structural and proce­
dural features of the court. The comparatively high rate 
of detention found in the court appears to result from 
the manner in which status offenders are handled in the 
court and the fact that the sample contains a greater 
proportion of certain "detention prone" youths (to be dis­
cussed below).
The variability of detention decisions? in the traditional 
court appears to be related to the court * s high centrali­
zation of authority and low differentiation and task 
specification. High centralization of authority is mani­
fested in that the judge controls decision making in the 
court. The judge administers the detention unit and 
controls its budget. The judge makes the detention 
decisions, controls the hiring and firing of detention 
personnel, and even provides personal financial assistance 
for the maintenance of the detention facility. in addition,
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neither a union nor a merit system of appointment and 
promotion exists for detention personnel.
Centralized authority in the traditional court 
reduces the need for rules and regularized criteria of 
decision making, (cf. previous research that indicates that 
decision making in traditional courts is done in terms of 
the "best interests of the child.") Detention decision 
making thus may not be consistent and regularized, as it 
appeared in the due process court, but rather may be done 
in a broadly defined and thus highly personalized manner.
It is suggested that the personalized nature of detention 
decision making in the traditional court results in low 
predictability in detention decisions.
Low differentiation and task specification in the 
traditional court-are reflected in the role of the judge.
The judge functions as judge, attorney for the defense, 
and prosecutor (Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, American Journal 
of Sociology, forthcoming). This means that the judge 
makes decisions regarding the intake of juveniles (includ­
ing the detention decision), as well as the adjudication 
and disposition of their cases. Neither the ideology nor 
the related structure and procedure of the traditional 
court accommodate an adversarial system of justice. Thus 
a true adversary for the rights of a juvenile (other than 
perhaps the judge) does not operate in the traditional 
court. As a result the judge is left unchallenged in 
the decision process. It is suggested that this permits, as
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well as^promb t e s,low predictability in detention decision 
making.
The relatively high rate of detention found in the 
traditional sample may be related to the manner in which 
status offenders are handled in the two courts. While 
the traditional and due process courts both have status 
offender orientation (i.e., both courts accept status 
offenders into their jurisdiction), it is the policy of 
the due process court not to detain status offenders, but 
to automatically refer them to an outside agency (a 
separately administered State Department of Social Services). 
Thirty five and one half percent of all the juvenile 
cases in the due process court were status offenders.
Just three percent (N = 3) of these were detained (probably 
because the juveniles committed other offenses in addition 
to the status affenses). There is no official policy 
regarding the detention or nondetention of status offenders 
in the traditional court. Status offenders account for 
approximately 18 percent of the cases in the court. These 
differences explain in part the much higher rate of deten­
tion found in the traditional court (50 percent as opposed 
to 16.1 percent in the due process court). The detention 
rate in the due process court might have been closer to 
that found in the traditional court had status offenders 
been subjected to detention.
The higher rate of detention in the traditional court 
may be related also to the fact that the court contained 
a substantially larger proportion of youths with one or
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more previous court contacts (39.5 percent versus 16.5 
percent in the due process court). The analyses conducted 
here, as well as previous research, indicate that this 
variable is significantly related to the detention 
decision. Had the due process court contained more 
cases with one or more previous court contacts, the 
rates of detention might have been closer in the two 
courts.
The alternative hypotheses, then, are that: detention
decisions in the due process court are made according 
to regularized, if implicit .criteria and detention deci­
sions in the traditional court are more personalized. I 
suggest that the alternative hypotheses are congruent with 
the original theoretical premises regarding the effect 
of court type (as measured by the five structural and 
procedural dimensions) on the detention decision.
It is necessary at this point to discuss several 
additional issues that are raised by the findings. For 
example, it might be argued that the relatively small 
amounts of variance explained in the court samples reflect 
the effects of chance rather than systematic variation. 
This, of course, would cast doubt on any interpretation.
The analyses do not support this argument, however, as 
seen, for example, in the chi square analyses that 
revealed systematic variation between four of the inde­
pendent variables and detention.
The large amount of variance left unexplained in both
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samples (90 percent and 69 percent in select regression 
analyses of the traditional and due process courts, 
respectively) suggests that factors other than those 
included in the analyses are related to the detention 
decision. Undoubtedly, other variables did influence 
the detention decision process in the two courts. The 
purpose of this study was to measure the effect of court 
type on the pre-adjudicatory detention decision, however. 
The findings indicate the existence of systematic varia­
tion in the relationship between court type and the 
detention decision. The findings are consistent with the 
theoretical premises that led to the original hypotheses —  
i.e., that court type, as measured by five structural 
and structural dimensions, is causally related to the 
detention decision. The alternative hypotheses that were 
generated are also consistent with the original theoretical 
premises.
It is possible to identify several of the variables 
which, in addition to or in combination with court 
structure, may have affected the detention decision. This 
discussion suggests the need and some possible directions 
for future research.
It is likely that complex interactions existed 
between court type, the different case characteristics 
of the samples, and certain other factors that influenced 
the nature of the detention decisions in the two samples. 
The detention decision might have been affected, for 
example, by the particular philosophy toward detention
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held by the individual(s) charged with making this deci­
sion, the resources available within the juvenile court 
system to contain detained youths, and perhaps by public 
opinion. It may be the case that any number of "hidden 
agendas" (cf. Blumberg, 1977) exists within the organiza­
tional framework of the juvenile court that affect the 
detention decision. Hidden agendas refer to priorities 
within an organization that may affect organizational 
processes but that exist outside the realm of an organi­
zation* s stated or commonly acknowledged goals, purposes 
and methods of operation*
Future researchers may also want to examine the fol­
lowing variables in addition to court type: the nature
of a juvenile's previous police contacts, the victim's 
preference regarding a case, and the subject's demeanor 
(Cohen and Kleugal 1975).
It is important also that future research dealing 
with decision making in juvenile courts employ systematic 
multivariate data analyses and use multiple court 
comparisons. These conditions have not always been met 
in prior research, but they are necessary to assure 
methodological adequacy.
In sum, future research should introduce and systema­
tically measure the effects of court type as an 
explanatory variable. I have shown here that structural 
and procedural characteristics are systematically related 
to the pre-adjudicatory detention decision in two juvenile
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court samples. The findings and the alternative hypo­
theses are consistent with the basic thesis that court 
type is causally related to the detention decision.
APPENDIX A
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Enter Gault court classification 4-digit 










09 - Others as
10 - Others as
11 — Others as
INDIVIDUAL ID
A 4-digit number corresponding to the names 
and file numbers which apply will be supplied 
by Janice and Vaughn on your sample list.
Take care to right-justify the numbers. The 
first case is 0001— not 1000.
SEX OF INDIVIDUAL JUVENILE 
Male = 1 
Female = 0 
MV = 0
Code what is on the court record, not what 
you believe the value to be. For instance, 
if no gender identification is supplied for 
a Jane Doe, do not code "O". The appropriate 
code is "9".








Follow the court record classifications, not 
your judgment (or the judgment voiced during 
conversations with a probation officer, 
clerk or other court official). Spanish 
surname does not supercede a white or black 
ethnic classification. Mixed classifications, 
if they occur, are coded as such.
White (W., Caucasian, Cauc) ................. 1
Black (B., Negro) ............    2
Mexican (Chicano)  ..................   3
Puerto Rican ............    4
Oriental .............    5
American Indian, Alaskan, Native  .......  6
Mixed ..................   7
O t h e r ......       8
M V ...........        9
Recode for Analysis
White = 1 
Non-White = o 
MV = 9
AGE ~ DATE OF BIRTH
MMDDYY = Month, day, year, e.g., 





MMDDYY = Month, day, year
See instructions for age classifications 
MV = 999999
Take care to right-justify month 
and day codes, e.g., Jan. 5 =
0105, not "1050"
If three dates given, use the 
two that match. If two ages 
given, use the oldest.
If too confusing —  "999999".
In all cases where the date is 
being coded, code as "missing" 
only those parts of the data for 
which information is unavailable. 
That is, if only "1976" is 




IMPORTANT: Date of intake is defined as
date of intake into court 
processing system, i.e., the 
date logged into the books as 
the date on which the designa­
ted court personnel first take 
notice of the petition/complaint. 
Date of intake is not date of 
police arrest. Date of intake 
may also be date of detention*
The date of intake for physical referrals was 
coded as the date they were brought in, re­
gardless of whether they were detained or not.
The date of intake for paper referrals was 
determined by the date when intake initiated 
activity on the case.
In City 3 and City 4 the time between date of 
apprehension and date of intake varied from 
several days to weeks, so we added another 
variable, date of apprehension, for these 
two courts. In City 1 this information was 
not collected. See V14 0. In City 2 it was 
usually the same as the date of apprehension.
DATE OF DETENTION
MMDDYY = Month, day, year
See instructions for age classifications
MV = 999999
Not detained = 000000
Detention defined: Secure detention NOT
foster home or shelter care placement. Date 
on which youth is placed in a secure deten­
tion facility. If this date occurs BEFORE 
date of intake then date of intake should 
correspond to date of detention. E.g., a 
youth is brought into detention at 5:30 
p.m. on Friday, March 14— the date of a deten­
tion hearing is set for Monday, March 17th.
Date of detention and date of intake are 
the same in this instance 0314 80.
If a youth was in shelter care and not ever 
in detention, V108 was coded as the date of 
shelter care. VI19 was coded "4" (not detained) 
and V120 was coded to show when the youth 
was m  shelter. V121 was coded as the 
number of days the youth was in shelter care.
If a youth was in detention and shelter care, 








on V108, V109 and V121.
DATE OF DETENTION HEARING
MMDDYY = Month, day year
See instructions for age classification 
MV (Also no detention hearing) = 99 9999
If the youth was in shelter care and never 
detained, then if there was a shelter care 
hearing the date was coded here. If a 
youth was in both detention and shelter 
care, the date is for detention.
DATE OF INTAKE CONFERENCE
MMDDYY — Month, day, year
See instructions for age classification
MV = 999999
No conference = 999999
The date of intake conference applies to 
that date where-a youth and/or parents are 
called into the juvenile court for a pre- 
hearing, nonjudicial conference with an 
intake worker, probation official. If it 
is classified in court records as an arraign 
ment hearing, or any hearing before a judge, 
master, or referee, then "999999" is the 
appropriate code.
An intake conference was further defined 
to mean that the purpose was to determine 
if the case should be processed formally 
or informally. In City 3, where intake 
has specific guidelines for deciding 
which youths can be diverted and the prose­
cutor makes the decision to handle formally 
or dismiss, there was no intake conference, 
given this definition.
DATE OF 1st COURT APPEARANCE
MMDDYY = Month, day, year
See instructions for age classification
MV = 999999
No appearance = 999999
The date of first court appearance is the 
date the youth first comes before the court 
officer designated as judicial. This date 
may and often does correspond with date 
of detention hearing. It may also corres­
pond to an arraignment hearing, fact-finding 
hearing or some "label" particular to the 
juvenile court being studied. Regardless
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of the function of the hearing--it should 
be coded as the date where the youth1s 
case is first reviewed by a judicial 
figure, with the youth present.
The purpose of the 1st court hearing and 
the number of subsequent hearings varied 
in each site.
In City 1 virtually every referral is for­
mally processed. At the first court 
appearance in City 1 a decision was made 
on whether to file a petition and it 
could also be a detention hearing.
In City 2 the 1st appearance, called a 
preliminary appearance or referee hearing, 
was an arraignment and a detention hear­
ing if the youth was being held. If a 
guilty plea was entered it sometimes became 
the adjudicatory and disposition hearing.
In City 3 the initial hearing, if the youth 
was being detained, was a detention hear­
ing and usually an arraignment. If a 
youth pleaded not guilty then a date for 
adjudication was set. Normally plea-bar- 
gaining went on and a guilty plea was 
entered to reduce charges a day or two 
before the date for trial.
City 4 appeared to have the most court 
appearances per case. The initial hearing 
was, in the case of detained youths, a 
detention hearing. Then there would be 
a preliminary hearing separate from the 
detention hearing. A case would often 
have two preliminary hearings if it were 
contested. Then there could be an adjudi­
catory hearing but a finding would not be 
entered until the disposition hearing.
V112 DATE QF ADJUDICATION, FINDING, OR ENTERING OF 
"TRUE FINDING"
MMDDYY = Month, day, year
See instructions for age classifications
MV = 999999
No adjudication or adjudication withheld = 
999999
This date corresponds to that date where 
a court takes formal action concerning 
jurisdiction. It may well correspond to 
the day of detention hearing and 1st court
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appearance. In cases where these dates 
correspond the same date is to be entered 
for each variable. Not all cases have an 
Adjudication date.
If adjudication was withheld and the case 
continued pending adjustment— no date of 
adjudication was entered.
If the youth pleaded guilty the date 
recorded was the date the court accepted 
the plea in open court.
In City 4, if it were a contested case and 
at the adjudicatory hearing the youth was 
found guilty but the judge did not enter 
the finding until the disposition hearing, 
the date of the adjudicatory hearing was 
the date coded. If the case wasn't con­
tested and the youth pleaded guilty but 
the judge did not find him/her guilty until 




This date corresponds to the date of enter­
ing a disposition of the case. Important 
it may well be the same date as 1st court 
appearance and detention. If so, code as 
that date.
in cases where no disposition is recorded 
or inferred from record and/or where no 
date is entered, enter the MV code
This category was broadened to include the 
date the court or intake disposed of a 
case, regardless of whether it was done 
formally or informally. If a decision was 
made to divert a youth to a "strings 
attached" diversion program the date of 
disposition is the date the decision was 
made, not the date diversion received the 
referall or date diversion was completed. 
All cases with complete records have a 
disposition date coded.
DATE OF DISPOSITION
MMDDYY = Month, day, year




* *VI14 LIVING WITH (IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO OFFENSE)
FI. 0 Both parents . .............................1
Mother & Stepfather/other male ......... 2
Father & Stepmother/other female . ........3
Mother only ..................... . ....... 4
Father only  ................    ...5
Other relative ....................  6
Foster home and shelter care  ......... 7
Group home or Institution  .............. 8
Other includes with friends or runaway ..0
MV ................    9
Recode for Analysis
1 =  1 
2 & 3 = 2 
4 & 5 = 4 
6 =  6
7, 8 & 0 =7 
9 = 9
Residential status, if not actually recorded, 
may be inferred from probation record, if 
available. Residential status should be 
recorded as being that of date of case 
occurrence {entry date).
In cases where residential status is im­
possible/difficult to determine enter the 
MV code.
If a youth was charged with running away, 
living with Was coded as where the youth 
was immediately before running.
If a youth was charged with an offense and 
also was a runaway, but was not charged with 
the offense of running away, then runaway 
was coded for "living with."
**Vll5 FAMILY COMPOSITION
F1.0 Both parents   1
Mother & Stepfather/other male ..........2
Father & Stepmother/other female .........3
Mother only    . 4
Father only .............................. 5
Other relative ................ 6





1 =  1 
2 & 3 = 2 
4 & 5 = 4 
6 =  6 
7 & 0 = 7 
9 = 9
This was defined as where the youth normally 
had resided during his/her life or during 
the past several years if that is different
from the rest of his/her life. It is not 
an indicator of the marital status of his 
parents.
**V116 ACTIVITY
Fl.G In school    . ..1
In school is determined as presently enrol­
led in a school— full time student, even if 
on vacation.
Employed  ........................   2
Not in school but employed
Work-study,...................................3
Both in school and employed includes summer 
job.
Alternative special school .................. 4
Job training, apprenticeship ................. 5
Idle ..................  6
Other (inc ludes inst itutiona 1 iz ed)) ......... 7
MV ...    9
Recode for Analysis
1, 3 & 4 = 1 
2 & 5 = 2 
6 =  6 
7 & 9 = 9
V117 COURT ENFORCED ACTIVITY
F1.0 (Special work and restitution programs. If
No mention is made in the record of such 










If the youth was in a court ordered work 
program or making restitution at the time 
(s)he was apprehended then "yes" was coded.
LEGAL (LAWYER) ACTIVITY
Where it is possible to do so, identify the 
"type" of legal activity. When a lawyer's 
name is entered, and it is not possible to 
identify the name with one of the types of 
activity, then code "other attorney-unspeci­
fied" (5).
Public defender .................... .........
Legal a i d .......   . ............
Appointed private attorney .... .............
Code 3 includes use of an "attorney's 
list" from court or local bar associ­
ation.
Retained private attorney  ..............
Other attorney— unspecified .................
No attorney ....... .............. ..............
M V ..... ...................... ................
If a public defender was present at arraign­
ment and a private attorney was present at 
adjudication then "private attorney" was 
coded.
If counsel was present at arraignment but not 
at a subsequent adjudication hearing, then 
"no attorney" was coded.
The primary form of legal counsel in City 2 
was appointed counsel; in 1, 3, & 4, it was 
a public defender.
Cities 2, 3, & 4 automatically had legal 
counsel present at the initial hearing.
DETENTION RECORD
This category refers to when a youth was 
detained. Variable 121 refers to how long. 
Detention refers to secure facilities.
Youth detained before first
court appearance ........   1
Youth detained, after first court
appearance and before disposition ............ 2
Detained both before and after .............. .3
Not detained ................... 4
MV ............................................ 9
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V120 SHELTER CARE RECORD
F1.0 IMPORTANT: If the court record or social
file has a place of entry for 
detention record and status—  
and this is not filled in—  
then code "4" on V119 & V120.
If there is no such place for 
data entry— and there is no 
record of detention— enter MV
code "9".
Shelter, foster home, special nonsecure 
placement before 1st court appearance....... ..1
Shelter, foster home, special nonsecure
placement after 1st court appearance
and before disposition ..................... ..2
Shelter care both before and after ...........3
No shelter care ......................... . .... 4
M V ........   9
Refer to V108 for other changes in V120 
and V121.
VI21 LENGTH OF DETENTION
F3.0 Record actual number of days (3 col. code)
4 on 119 = 999 
9 on 119 = 999 
MV = 999
If a youth was detained after disposition 
until placement and we could not determine 
when placement occurred then the length 
was coded 999.
If the youth was not detained or placed in 
shelter care V121 was coded "000."
**V122 NUMBER OF PREVIOUS COURT CONTACTS - OFFICIAL 
F2.0 This applies to prior contact with the
court where there has been judicial notice 
taken of the case. Remember to right 
justify the numbers.
Record Actual Number (2 col. code)
MV = 99
If a youth was referred for 3 separate 
offenses at different times but they were 






this was counted as one official contact.
If there was a record of a referral but 
no information on whether it was handled 
formally or not, it was not counted.
NUMBER OF "NOT TRUE" FINDINGS OR ACQUITTALS ON 
PREVIOUS CHARGES
Record Actual Number (2 col. code)
None = 00 
MV = 99
Recode
0 =  0 
1 =  1
2 & over = 2 
MV = 00
If a youth was referred on multiple charges 
and at adjudication (s)he was acquitted on 
some, but not all— no "not true findings" 
were recorded.
We counted not true contacts rather than 
charges to keep the numbers consistent with 
number of official contacts.
If the charge was nolle prossed by the 
prosecutor prior to a court hearing it was 
counted as an unofficial contact.
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS COURT CONTACTS - UNOFFICIAL 
Number of prior contacts with court where 
court has instituted some action, (e.g., 
informal probation/handling, diversion, 
referral, counsel and warn) with no judicial 
notice taken. This information will probably 
be found in a probation report.
Record actual number ( 2 col. code)
MV = 99
Recode
0 =  0 
1 =  1







WHETHER ONE OR MORE OFFENSES
Single offense at intake .... ............
Multiple offense at intake ....  ............
M V .......... . ...... ................. ......
The number of offenses at intake does not 
always agree with the number of charges 
coded in variables 130-132. The information 
on charges was obtained at two steps to 
compare original number of charges with 
the number at adjudication. Number of 
charges at intake usually represented what 
the police had charged the youth with, not 
intake1s decision on charges.
In City 2 this information was taken from 
a yellow sheet filled out at intake.
In City 3 it was taken from a pink sheet 
filled out by intake if the youth was 
brought in. If it was a paper referral 
in Court 3 we took if from the transmittal 
letter from intake to diversion.
In City 4 it was taken from the form that 
Intake completed and then sent on to the 
prosecutor.
NATURE OF THE CHARGE/COMPLAINT
Delinquency petition . . .  .....................1
Record how the court defines the act.
In the absence of such a definition 
code as a delinquency any indication 
offense or misdemeanor.
Status complaint/petition  ............ .2
Again, how the court defines the complaint 
or petition. It may be a "status" offense 
such as runaway or incorrigibility, but 
if the court defines the event or case as 
delinquency, code "L".
IMPORTANT: Persons in Need of Supervision
(PINS), Children in Need of 
Supervision (CINS, CHINS),
Minor in Need of Supervision 
(MINS), may be included in 
this category. In some 
jurisdiction this type of 










Family in Need of Supervision ............. 1
A special cateogry where the entire 
family situation is brought to the 
attention of the court. Often used 
in place of a CINS or Neglect 
petition.
Dependency or Neglect complaint/petition...4
MR (Mental Retardation)
DD (Developmentally Disabled  ............ 5
Violation of Probation/Parole/Aftercare 
Court Condition of Supervision .......6
Traffic .........   7
Other ................  8
M V   ..........    9
Violation of Probation was coded if that 
was the only charge— if this was what the 
petition read or if there was an administra­
tive hearing to revoke probation. If the 
youth supposedly had violated probation, 
but was charged with a new offense, the 
offense was coded. An exception was youths 
charged with escape from an institution— it 
was coded VOP.
This information was taken from the petition 
when applicable. In the case of unofficial 
handling it reflects the alleged offense(s) 
at intake.
In City 4 status offenses were coded as 
"Dependency or Neglect."
DIVERSION STATUS
Youth is/was in a diversion program Yes..1
No. . 0 
MV. . 9
IMPORTANT: "IS" MEANS THE CHILD IS IN A
DIVERSION PROGRAM AT THE TIME 
INTAKE.
"WAS" MEANS THE CHILD WAS TAKEN 
OUT OF A DIVERSION PROGRAM IN 
ORDER TO FILE LATEST CHARGE.
IF EITHER OF THESE CONDITIONS 
APPLY, CODE "YES." IF THE CHILD 
WAS IN DIVERSION, IT ENDED
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"NATURALLY" AND IS NO LONGER 
IN DIVERSION, CODE "NO."
IF THIS CHILD HAS NEVER BEEN 
IN A DIVERSION PROGRAM, CODE 
"NO. "




NATURE OF HANDLING OF CASE 
Official Handling ... 1
Any action leading to a judicial review 
of the case and the formal establishment 
of the jurisdictional predicate— even for 
a short period of time. This includes 
consent decrees and not guilty findings.
If the youth ever had a judicial hearing 
"official handling" was coded even though _ 
later the case may have been diverted.
Unofficial handling ................  2
Any action less than above which leads 
to a nonjudicial resolution of the case.
There is not formal jurisdiction exercised 
and no coercive sanction applied which is 
enforceable. Does not include consent 
decrees reviewed or signed by judicial 
officers. Includes referral to an 
outside agency, counsel and warn, and 
unofficial probation.
Diversion status .........  3
Case is handled on condition of entry into 
a diversion program, either administered 
directly by the court or by another agency. 
Coercive action can be applied if youth 
does not comply with terms of diversion.
Case is not handled ........  4
There is a record of a complaint— but 
intake has declined the case. Does rot 
include counsel and warn.
MV ........................................... 9
City 1 made almost all cases official.
In City 2 if the case was handled informally 
but the youth had to make restitution or 
make a donation to charity— then it was 





In City 3 there was a formal diversion 
agency and if the youth didn't meet 
the requirements of the diversion con­
tract (s)he was sent back to court. 
Unofficial handling was seldom used.
In City 4 diversion meant a mediation 
program operated by the prosecutor.
Youths referred to it could be sent 
back to court if they did not comply 
with the mediated decision. City 4 




Evidence is in file to indicate that 
the youth denied charge or otherwise 
wishes to contest the allegations of 
the complaint or petition.
Not Contested .............................. 0
Youth admits and/or waives an adjudi­
cation (fact-finding) hearing. Includes 
consent decree.
M V ............  9
If a youth pleaded not guilty at the 
initial judicial hearing it was coded 
as "contested," even if the youth 
later changed his/her plea.
**OFFENSE CLASSIFICATION
CHARGE #1 - CHECK ONLY ONE on 1st offense 
listed in order listed on the record 
for the date of entry.
Abortion  ......   .01
Aggravated Assault/Battery ................ 02
Aiding and abetting (compounding a
crime) ....................................03
Alcohol (includes "minor in possession"
and "public drunkeness" ........  04
Arson (setting nonstructural fires) .......05
Arson-structural .................  06
Assault, Assault/Battery (not aggravated)..07
Battery  ............................. 0 8
Bench Warrant  0 9
Bribery .....................  10
Burglary ..............     H
Contempt of Court .......................... 12
Courtesy Hold  ............  13
Courtesy Investigation  ...................14
Court Order Hold  ....4..................... 15
Curfew...........     .....16
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Dependency/Neglect ..........   17
Disorderly conduct ......................18
Disturbing the P e a c e  ......  19
Drugs (unspecified) .....................20
DWI-DUI ...........    21
Escape from Custody (fleeing) .......... 22
Extortion     .   .23
Fighting .............. '.................24
Firing a Gun .......................... ..25
Forgery...........    26
Fraud (con or swindle) ................. 27
Fraud (credit cards) ..... ............. 2 8
Fugitive Warrant ................   29
Gambling (possession of lottery tickets)30
Glue/Paint (inhalents) ..................31
Grand Larceny (unspecified) ......   32
Hit and R u n ..........  33
Hold witness ............................ 34
Homicide ....................  ...35
Incorrigibility.......    36
Indecent exposure  ........  37
Information ............................. 38
Intimidation (not extortion) ...........3 9
Joyriding ............................... 40
Kidnap ................. 41
Larceny (misc.)    42
Loitering........   43
Malicious Mischief (includes "malicious 
destruction of public or private
property and "Criminal mischief" .....44
Manslaughter  ........................... 45
Marijuana Possession ...................4 6
Moving vehicle violation ............... 4 7
Nonmoving vehicle violation ............ 48
Harassment and Threats ................. 49
Obstructing (unspecified) ......   50
Opium-Heroin ............................ 51
Other dangerous drugs ...................52
Perjury ........  53
Petty Embezzlement......................54
Pick pocket........    55
Pimping ................................. 56
Possession of Burglary Tools .........   57
Possession of stolen property  ......58
Possession of stolen vehicle ........... 59
Probation/parole violation ........  60
Prostitution (male and female) ......... 61
Purse Snatch ............................ 62
Purse Snatch (no force) .....  63
Refusal to aid police (includes 
"failure to obey" and "inter­
fering with" a police officer ........ 64
Resisting an Officer ....................65








Robbery (Weapon) ......................... 68
Runaway  .............  69
Sexual Assault (Attempted Rape) .........70
Sexual Assault (Lewd & lacivious) ...... 71
Sexual Assault (Molestation) ....  72
Sexual Assault (Rape) ......... 73
Sexual Assault (Sodomy) ................ .74.
Shoplifting (not grand larceny) .......... 75
Smuggling .................................76
Statutory Rape ...............  77
Stolen vehicle (misc.).................... 78
Theft of Vehicle ............  79
Trespass ..................................80
Truancy......   81
Unspecified Status  .....................82
Vagrancy...........    83
Tampering with an auto and auto prowl ...84
Weapons (unspecified)  .................85
Other (includes "attempted" anything, 
some strange property offenses, and
acting without a license .............. 86
M V   ...................................99
Offenses were coded from petitions when 
available. Otherwise they were coded 




Use same list and code second offense listed 
on record for date of entry. If there is 
no record, offense code "99".
OFFENSE CLASSIFICATION 
CHARGE #5
Use same list and code third offense listed 
on record for date of entry. If there is 
no record, offense code "99".
IS YOUTH UNDER OPERATIONAL SUPERVISION OF COURT
AT TIME OF INTAKE
Includes formal Probation/Parole 
and/or supervision by court or 
executive agency    ............ Yes ..1 
No . . 0 
MV . . 9
Interpret violation of Probation or Court 
0£der on "Yes"(1). If no record found of
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being on supervision and record seems 
complete, code "No"(0). If records " 
are missing which would have this 
information, code "MV"(9).
The definition was broadened to include 
youths presently involved with the court 
on other charges, being processed separated 
from the charge(s) we were following. It 
does not include youths under the court's 
supervision as a dependent or neglected 
child.
V137 COURT DISPOSITION
F2.0 FOR FORMAL CASES ONLY,. MUST HAVE CODE "1" in
variable 128
Committed to a secure
facility/correctional/large institution/ 
ranch/training school .......    01
Committed to care and custody 
of a nonsecure facility or 
situation/group home (also
includes foster care .....  02
Suspended sentence/probation ............ ...03
Probation ................. 04
Transferred to another state, or court
accepted a plan for diversion or put
the youth in a diversion program........... .05
Committed to a mental health facility......06
Warned and released  ........................ 07
Restitution (includes community service) ...08
Finding vacated or to be vacated
pending adjustment ............................ 09
Continuance (unspecified)  ............. .10
V133 COURT FINDING AND ADJUDICATION QN CHARGE #1
F2 .0
IMPORTANT: FOR CODES 01 - 08, MUST HAVE CODED "1"
ON V12 8.
Finding of delinquency/true finding........ 01
Finding of CINS, PINS, etc.  .............. 02
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Finding of not true, charge dismissed .....03
Finding of "hold" under advisement— "
continuance pending adjustment ........ 04
Waiver to adult court ..........  05
Unspecified continuance .  .........   .06
Held for examination i.     . .   .07
Nothing recorded on the establishment
of jurisdiction but a disposition
is entered after formal hearing ........... 08
No official court finding— case was 
disposed of unofficially— MUST 
HAVE CODE ”2" ”3", "4" or "9" in 
Variable 128  .............. 09
Plea bargained ................. 96
Other ....................................... 97
Nolle prosse ................................98
M V ........................  99
The pother" category includes "filed 
directly in adult court" and "charges 
dropped by complainant after arraignment."
V134 COURT FINDING ON CHARGE #2
F2.0 Check V131
V135 COURT FINDING ON CHARGE #3
Check V132
Recode
01, 02, & 96 = 01 
03 = 03
04, 06, & 07 = 04 
05 = 05 









Protective supervision  .............. 11
Probation with restitution  ........ 12
Not applicable .............   98
M V ...........    99
Recode
1, 2 & 6 = 1 
3, 4 & 12 = 3 
5, 8, 9 & 10 = 5 
7 = 7 




Yes  ..........     . . 1
No (MV) V . ....................................................  0
NOTICE OF UNUSUAL LEGAL ACTIVITY
Indicate yes if special court motions 
are on record (e.g., motion to suppress 
evidence).
Yes ....................................... 1
No (MV)  .....   0
SPECIFY ON ANSWER SHEET
Includes motions to suppress, to dismiss, 
depositions, etc.
DATE OF APPREHENSION
This is the date that the youth was arrested 
or a complaint was made. We added this 
variable to have a more precise idea of the 
processing time on paper referrals. Cities 
3 & 4 were the two places where this data 
was collected because of the delay between 






The variable of offense type is measured using the 




disorderly conduct, disturbing the 
peace, driving while intoxicated, 
loitering, traffic violation, escape 
from custody, bench warrant, court 
order, hold, probation/parole viola­
tion, refusal to aid police.
alcohol, drugs, prostitution, lewd 
and lascivious conduct.
Status Offenses: curfew violation, incorrigibility,
runaway, truancy, dependency/neglect, 
and unspecified status offenses.
Property Offenses:-^arson, burglary, forgery, fraud, grand
larceny, joyriding, malicious mischief, 
possession of burglary tools, possession 
of stolen property, possession of 
stolen vehicle, purse snatch, shoplift­
ing, theft of vehicle, trespass, auto 
prowl, weapons.
aggravated assault and battery, simple 
assault and battery, hit and run, 
harassment and threats, resisting an 








Variable Name % N % N
Social Variables
*Age 13.5182
7-13 13.3 (33) 20.6 (51)
14 12.9 (32) 16.1 (40)
15 28.2 (70) 25.8 (64)
16 23.0 (57) 24.2 (60)



















White -67.3 (167) 68.1 (169)














Both Parents 33.5 (83) 30.2 (75)
Parent and Step-
Parent 12.5 (31) 14.9 (37)
Single Parent 41.5 (103) 31.0 (77)
Other Relative 6.0 (15) 8.5 (21)
















"other** 23.4 (58) 8.5 (21)
Vice 4.0 (10) 9.3 (23)
Status 18.1 (45) 35.5 (88)










None 60.5 (150) 83.5 (207)
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NOTES
The Gault Project was the product of a grant awarded by 
the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention to the National Center for State Courts.
The National Center for State Courts is located in 
Williamsburg, Virginia. It is a non-profit/ research- 
oriented organization concerned with the problems and 
issues of state court systems.
For a description of data used in the typology, data 
collection processes, and the analytic techniques used 
in creating the—typology, see Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, 
American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming.
There in effect was no separate juvenile justice system 
in the United States prior to 1899. In this year legis­
lation was passed by the State of Illinois ruling that 
children under the age of sixteen could not be treated as 
criminals. This was the first such legislation of its 
kind. The legislation proscribed the arrest, indictment, 
convictment, imprisonment, or punishment of juveniles. 
Inclusion of status offenders within the jurisdiction is 
not consistent with the "ideal type" due process court.
The court selected to represent this type was the best 
available source of data.
Multicollinearity occurs when the second of two highly 
correlated variables actually explains the same varia­
tion as the first due to considerable overlap of the 
two (Blalock 1979:485). Multicollinearity creates 
severe difficulties in assessing the individual and 
unrelated effects of each independent variable.
Note that the dependent variable has been coded as 
follows: 0 = Detained 1 = Not Detained.
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